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misdemeanor. This is contrary to the established principal that an
indictment as accessory before the fact will not support a conviction
of the principal offense. This inconsistency accentuates the difficulty
caused by retention of the pleading distinction between accessory
before the fact and principal. As early as 1916, maintaining accessory before the fact as a separate substantive offense was recognized
as an undesirable fiction whose only purpose was to abrogate common law procedural difficulties.33 However, West Virginia retains
this distinction even though it provides for equal punishment 34 and
has abolished the common law technicality that the principal must
be tried and convicted prior to the trial of the accessory before the
fact to the same crime. 5 Legislative enactment to permit indictment
and trial of accessories before the facts as principals should be forthcoming, as further recognition of the common law distinction will
only continue to confuse and frustrate the criminal system of justice
in West Virginia.
Charles C. Wehner

Negligence-Intoxicating Liquors-Vendor's Liability for
Damages by Intoxicated Patrons
Plaintiff was injured when the car he was driving collided with
one driven by defendant O'Connell. Alleging that O'Connell was intoxicated as a result of being served alcoholic beverages in defendant Sager's tavern, plaintiff brought a common-law action for negligence against O'Connell, Sager, and the owner of the car O'Connell
was driving. The sale to O'Connell by Sager had been in violation of
a statute prohibiting sale of alcoholic beverages to any intoxicated
person. The trial court sustained defendant Sager's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint against him. Held,
reversed by the California Supreme Court. The plaintiff had brought
himself within that class of persons for whose protection the statute
was designed. The harm occasioned plaintiff was the type contemplated by the statute thereby fastening liability on the tavern owner,
Sager. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1971).
33

3
3

Karakutza v. State, 163 Wis. 293, 156 N.W. 965 (1916).
ch. 61, art. 11, § 6 (Michie 1966).
W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 11, § 7 (Michie 1966).

4 W. VA. CODE

5
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The problem of the liability of a vendor of alcoholic beverages
has been one for both legislative and judicial inquiry. The legislative
approach to the vendor's potential liability has usually been manifested in legislation attaching civil liability to vendors for violation
of criminal statutes dealing with the sale of alcoholic beverages.1

Some jurisdictions, however, impose liability regardless of any criminal statutory violations.2 These latter acts are known as civil damage laws, or, as they are commonly referred to, "dram shop acts".3
Basically, dram shop acts are designed to protect certain classes
of persons from injuries resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated
person by imposing a form of strict liability on the vendor of the
intoxicant.4 However, the dram shop acts have suffered from certain

restrictions imposed by legislative enactment, for example, amount
of recovery' and time in which to bring suit.6
On the other hand, the judicial point of view has been to deny
a cause of action against the vendor in favor of either the patron or
an injured third party!7 The common law rule as generally stated
was that it was the consumption, not the furnishing of liquor, that
was the proximate cause of injury.8 This rule is illustrated by the
maxim: the sale of liquor to an able-bodied man is not negligence.9
IE.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958). For sales made contrary to the
provisions of laws regulating such sales, the statute gives a cause of action to
every wife, child, parent or other person for all damages actually sustained
in consequence of such illegal sale of liquor against the one who sold, gave
or otherwise disposed of the beverage. The statute also allows for exemplary
damages.
2
E.g., ORE. Rlv. STAT. § 30.730 (1969). Without regard to the legality
of the sale, the statute makes any person who sells, bargains or gives intoxicating liquors to an habitual drunk or intoxicated person liable for all damages to the wife, husband, parent or child of the habitual drunkard or intoxicated person.
3Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957).
4Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CAL.n. L. REv. 995,
996 (1969).
5
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4 § 716 (1953) ($500.00 maximum for all
recoveries).
6
E.g., CoNN. GENi. STAT. ANr. § 30-102 (Supp. 1971) (one year).
7 Collier v. Stamatis, 62 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Howlett v.
Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); State ex rel Joyce v. Hatfield,
197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W.
774 (1939).
8
Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 809, 142 P.2d 952, 955 (1943);
Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (1967); Tarwater v.
Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 513, 144 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1940).
9
Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill.
App. 335, 352 75 N.E.2d 132, 140

(1947).
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This maxim received nearly uniform application absent a dram shop
act. '1
Recently, however, a "substantial number if not a majority""
of cases have imposed liability on the vendor by applying basic
rules of negligence. Beginning with two important decisions in 1959,
Waynick v. Chicagds Last Department Store," and Rappaport v.
Nichols," the cases in those jurisdictions in which the issue has been
adjudicated appear to indicate a movement in favor of allowing recovery against the vendor. In those states which have addressed the
issue on negligence principles, only a few presently maintain the old
common law position.' Since Waynick in 1959, ten states,' 5 including California in the principal case, have adopted what has been
referred to as the "new common law" rule.' Additionally, New York
and Illinois, both states with dram shop acts, have indicated that in
the absence of such statutes they too would impose liability on the
principles of negligence.' 7 Adding the ten states following the new
common law rule to those twenty states' 8 that possess dram shop
Cal. 3d 153, - ,486 P.2d 151, 155, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1971).
1Id. at , 486 P.2d at 157, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
12269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959). In Waynick, an intoxicated Illinois
motorist injured a Michigan motorist in Michigan. Although both Illinois and
Michigan possessed dram shop acts, the court determined that neither would
apply extraterritorially and instead imposed liability on the vendor on the
basis of common law negligence.
'3 31 N. J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). In Rappaport, plaintiff's
decedent
was killed in a collision involving a minor who had been served intoxicating
beverages in violation of a statute at defendant's establishment. The court
allowed
recovery based on common law negligence principles.
4
Carr v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1965); Hull v. Rund, 150
Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d
54 (1969); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966);
Hall v. Budagher Bar, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966).
15Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971);
Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fischer, 247
Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky.
1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968);
Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
156 A.2d 1 (1959); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626,
198 A.2d 550 (1964); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d
755 (1965).
169 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 302 (1960). In a case comment on Waynick, the
court's decision was referred to as the "new common law rule" in that it was
the first
major case in abrogation of the old common law approach.
7
1 Colligan v. Comsar, 38 Il. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963);
Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. Ostego County
105

1965).8

' ALA. CODF tit. 7, §§ 120-21 (1958); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30102 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, H9 715-16 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 43, H9 135-36 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CoDE ANN. § 129.2 (1954);
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acts, it is evident that a majority of jurisdictions impose liability in
some form on the vendor of intoxicants for damages caused by his
patrons.
Characteristic of the new common law approach to liability is
a re-evaluation of the concept of proximate cause. The cases that
established the old common law rule consistently based their decision

on lack of proximate cause. Nevertheless, most of those opinions
offered little explanation as to the rationale by which the courts

reached their conclusions. 9 Although an analysis in terms of proximate cause typically involves considerations of foreseeability, intervening cause, and cause-in-fact, a less ambiguous approach in cases
dealing with a statutory standard of conduct might be to predicate liability primarily on breach of duty.2"
It is to this end that the court in Vesely formulated the main
issue stating, "[T] he . ... question.., is not one of proximate cause,
but rather one of duty: ...Did defendant Sager owe a duty of care

to plaintiff or to a class of persons of which he is a member?" 2 The
court in Sager avoided the perplexing proximate cause approach to
liability and instead utilized a statutory standard of conduct. By
coupling the liquor statute involving the illegal sale22 and the one
defining the purpose of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act23 with a

statute codifying a presumption of negligence arising from a violation
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 436.22
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.070
(1967); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATONS LAw § 11-101 (McKinney Supp. 1964);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-332 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1969);
Omo REV. CODE §§ 439.04-.05 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 121 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1969); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1-2 (1956);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.08.080 (1961);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-34 (1957).
9

Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943); Belding

v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 11 L.R.A. 53 (1890); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176

Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940). In all of these cases the courts failed to
rely on an analysis of the elements of proximate cause and merely quoted
precedent to deny a cause of action.
20
See L. GREEN, THE LTIGATION PRocEss IN TORT LAW 388 (1965),
where he suggested that the courts dispense with the proximate cause concept
altogether and approach the problem as one of duty.
21 Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, -,
486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623, 631 (1971).
22 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1960); "Every person
who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any
alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously
intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor."
23 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (Deering 1960), which provides
for the exercise of police power to promote the safety of the people.
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of a statute,24 the court was able to make out a clear case for the
plaintiff.2 5 With deferrence to the old common law rule, however,
the court was careful to refute the proximate cause argument in the
context of analyzing Waynick and Rappaport. Discussing the opinion
in Rappaport it stated: "Finally, the court [in Rappaport] rejected
the defendants' contention that their conduct, if negligent, was not the
proximate cause of the injuries suffered. 6 As to defendant's assertions that abrogation of the vendor's immunity is better left to the
legislature, the court concluded that the legislature had sufficiently
expressed its intentions in the enactment of the liquor statutes2" and
the evidence statute.28 Furthermore, the decision would expressly
avoid the areas of possible recovery against a non-commercial supplier or in favor of an injured patron.2 9
The question arises as to the present law in West Virginia. The
answer is that the precise issue has never been adjudicated in this
state." Obviously, with the recently enacted liquor by the drink
law,3 ' the great number of highway deaths attributable to drinking,32
and the course taken by the majority of jurisdictions in imposing
some form of liability, successful litigation in this area is a definite
possibility.
24

CAL. Evm. CODE § 669 (Deering Supp. 1971):
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He
violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2)
the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or injury to his person
or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the
statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
25 In essence what the court did was to establish the standard
of conduct
with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1960), to place the injured
party within the scope of that section with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001
(Deering 1960), and to suggest the breach of duty with CAL. Evm. Coon
§ 6692 6 (Deering Supp. 1971).
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, , 486 P.2d 151, 158, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623, 630 (1971).
27 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1960); CAL. Bus.
& PROF.
CODE § 23001 (Deering 1960).
28 CAL. EVm. CODE § 669 (Deering Supp. 1971).
29
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, -, 486 P.2d 151, 153, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623, 625
(1971).
0
Hawaii,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia have
also not litigated the issue of a tavern owner's liability.
'W. VA. CODE ch. 60, art. 7, § 3 (Michie Supp. 1971), which provides
for the
licensing of private clubs in West Virginia.
32
A recent national survey showed that the use of alcohol contributes to
some 25,000 deaths and 800,000 collisions in the United States each year.
STAFF OF HousE Conm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 90th CoNO. 2d SEss., ALCOHOL
AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, (Comm. Print 1968).
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Although the West Virginia court applies different principles of
negligence, perhaps, than the California court applied in Vesely,33
the basis of liability in this state is not completely unlike that in
some others that have adopted the new rule. In West Virginia negligence is the breach of a duty on the part of one person to exercise
care to protect another against injury.' " In New Jersey where Rappaport was decided the court has applied this same definition.

5

Addi-

tionally, West Virginia, like most jurisdictions, requires that the
injury be the proximate result of. the breach of duty in order to establish liability.36 The rule that has been applied in this state is that
the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence.3" Pennsylvania, where Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No.
1973,8 was decided, has invoked this same standard. 9
The duty, of course, refers to the relationship between the parties and may be created by rules, statutes or judicial decisions requiring the exercise of care by one party to protect another from
harm.4" Most of the jurisdictions following the new common law have
relied upon the violation of a liquor sales statute to establish the
duty.4" In West Virginia as in California" and Indiana4 the violation
of a statutory duty is prima facie negligence, i.e., such violation gives
rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence.44 The legislature of
West Virginia has provided a mechanism for establishing negligence
3 See text accompanying note 21 which indicates that the California
court based liability on a breach of duty and for all practical purposes dismissed the proximate cause approach.
34Uthermohlen v. Bogg's Run Co., 50 W. Va. 457, 459, 40 S.E. 410,
411 (1901).
35 Stanley Co. of America v. Hercules Powder Co. 16 N.J. 295, 315,
108 A.2d 616, 626 (1954).
36 Hartley v. Crede, 140 W. Va. 133, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954).
7
Anderson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 74 W. Va. 17, 19, 81 S..
579, 580 (1914).
38 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). The court formulated a duty independent of statute.
39Roach v. Kelly, 194 Pa. 24, 31, 44 A. 1090, 1091 (1899).
40
W. PRossEn, ToRTs § 53 (4th ed. 1971).
41 Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550
(1964) is the only observed instance in which the duty was not established
with 42
the aid of a liquor sale statute.
CAL. EVD. CODE § 669 (Deering Supp. 1971).
43
Northern Indiana Transit v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905
(1950), where the court held that a violation of a statute prohibiting angle
parking constituted prima facie negligence on the part of the violator.
44
Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Construction Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 102, 144
S.E. 881, 882 (1928).
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by enacting statutes which make the sale of liquor to an intoxicated
person or a minor" a misdemeanor.4 6 Although it is necessary that
the injured party bring himself and his injury within the class of persons and injuries the statute encompasses, the statute delineating the
purpose of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act should satisfy these
requirements." It would appear then that an allegation that a sale
of liquor to an inebriate who subsequently causes injury to a third
party as a result of his intoxicated condition would yield a prima
facie case of negligence against the vendor in West Virginia.
Some support for this position may be gained from an inspection
of the cases decided under the old West Virginia dram shop act.48 In
Mayer v. Forbe, for example, after holding the imposition of exemplary damages under the statute constitutional, the court continued:4 9
That the spirit and manifest intention of the law is good,
can not be denied; and if it could be made to effect the
object of its originators it would confer upon society a
boon of inestimable value; and, even though it should only
succeed in diminishing to a limited extent the widespread
sorrow, poverty and misery inflicted on the helpless and
innocent by the wretched slaves of a depraved and vicious
appetite, its enactment will not have been in vain.
Although the act was repealed, its intent remains manifest in the
statutes rendering a sale to an intoxicated person a misdemeanor. 0
It can certainly be argued that the act was repealed not because of a
re-appraisal of the interests the act was designed to protect," but
45 "Alcoholic Beverages shall not be sold to a person who is: (1) Less
than twenty-one years of age; (2) An habitual drunkard; (3) Intoxicated;
(4) Addicted to the use of narcotic drugs; (5) Mentally incompetent." W. VA.
CoDE ch. 60, art. 3, § 22 (Michie 1966).
46 It is a misdemeanor to "[slell alcoholic liquors to a person specified in
section twenty-two, article three (60-3-22) of this chapter." W. VA. CoDE
ch. 60, art. 6, § 8 (Michie 1966).
47 The purpose of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act is to "assure the
greatest degree of personal freedom that is consistent with the health, safety,
and good morals of the people of the State." W. VA. CODE ch. 60, art. 1, § 1
(Michie 1966). (emphasis supplied).
48 Acts of the l1th W. Va. Leg. ch. 99, Reg. Sess. (1872-73) [hereinafter
cited as Acts]; Acts ch. 107, Reg. Sess. (1877); Acts ch. 29, Reg. Sess. (1887);
Acts Ch. 3, Ex. Sess. (1904).
4940 W. Va. 246, 266, 22 S.E. 58, 66 (1895).
50
W. VA. CODE ch. 60, art. 3, § 22 (Michie 1966); W. VA. CODE ch. 60,
art. 6, § 8 (Michie 1966).
11 The West Virginia dram shop act provided basically for recovery of
all damages including exemplary damages suffered by any wife, husband,
child, parent or guardian against the vendor or landlord of the premises who
knowingly made illicit sales. Acts ch. 99, Reg. Sess. (1872-73).
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rather in response to the inequity of subjecting the vendor to strict
liability, a drawback that would not be evident in applying traditional
principles of negligence, such as the qualification of foreseeability.
The fact that the liquor stores in West Virginia are state owned
and operated might presuppose a reluctance on the court's .part to
subject the doctrine of sovereign immunity to further attack. Whatever the value of that venerable doctrine, the government's immunity
from civil liability is no longer as exclusive as it once was on either
the federal, state or local levels. Even so, governments are certainly
able to invoke the doctrine on their own accord, and the judiciary
could leave the sovereign powers to their own defenses in light of
the ease with which distinctions can be drawn between the liquor
store suppliers and the tavern owner suppliers.
There can be little doubt that the enormous loss of life and
property in this country due to alcoholism demands remedy. True,
it is incumbent upon the legislative and executive branches of the
government to propound solutions. More strict enforcement of existing laws and the creation of treatment programs for alcoholics would
be a step in the right direction. But it seems inconsistent that the
judiciary, with its peculiar capacity to provide both a deterrence to
alcoholic abuse and a more just distribution of the loss, should choose
to disregard the risk-producing activities of the commercial supplier.
Although certainly not the first jurisdiction to adopt this new common law rule, the California court in Vesely dispersed the old rule
with such alacrity that little doubt remains as to the general future
course of the law in the area.
Roger A. Wolfe

Real Property-Covenant of General WarrantyNovel Definition of Constructive Eviction in West Virginia
In 1960, defendant Hines conveyed by deed 145 acres of raw
timber land in Webster County to plaintiff Brewster. The deed contained a covenant of general warranty of title.' Besides the initial
1W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 4 § 2 (Michie 1966) provides:
A covenant by a grantor in a deed, 'that he will warrant generally

the property hereby conveyed,' or a covenant of like import, or the
use of the words 'with general warranty' in a deed, shall have the
same effect as if the grantor had covenanted that he, his heirs and
personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the said
property unto the grantee, his heirs, personal representatives and
assigns, against the claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.
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